University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1929

Bankruptcy, Partnership, Voidable Judgment Liens
Kenneth Craddock Sears

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kenneth Craddock Sears, "Bankruptcy, Partnership, Voidable Judgment Liens," 23 Illinois Law Review 483
(1929).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
BANKRUPTCY-PARTNERSIHIP-VOIDABLE

JUDGMENT LIENS.-

[United States] At length another cause of action has come to
rest and the law of bankruptcy as it involves the field of partnership has been clarified at one point. The Liberty National
Bank over eight years ago secured a judgment against the Roanoke
Provision Company, a partnership, and the two partners individually. They were insolvent at that time. This judgment became
a lien upon the real estate of the judgment debtors. Within four
months the partnership was adjudicated a bankrupt upon an involuntary petition which alleged insolvency. More than eight
months thereafter the two partners separately and individually
were adjudged bankrupts. The bank filed its claim, based on the
judgments, against the separate estates of the two partners and
asserted that it was entitled to priority -by virtue of its lien. The
trustee opposed this claim upon the theory that the adjudication
of the partnership as bankrupt-as distinguished from the adjudication of the two partners individually-within four months
after the judgment was secured caused the judgment lien to be
"null and void" under sec. 67f of the Bankruptcy Act. The Supreme Court of the United States held in the case under review
that the claim of the bank to priority
was well founded and re2
jected the argument of the trustee.
To state the decision in other terms the adjudication of
the partnership as an entity is one thing and the adjudication of
the partners individually is something different. The first ad1. Liberty National Bank v. Bear (1928) 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252. See also
Bear v. Liberty Natt. Bank (1922) 285 Fed. 703; s. c. 265 U. S. 365, 44 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 499, 68 L. Ed. 1057; s. c. 4 Fed. (2d) 240; 18 Fed. (2d) 281. No
reference was made to Ft. Pitt, etc., Co. v. Diser (1917) 239 Fed. 443. It
seems fundamentally to be opposed to the opinion under review.
2. Contrast these two points of view:
"It cannot be that the bankruptcy of the partnership carries the partners
into the proceeding with their assets and liabilities for the purpose of proving
debts, adjusting equities, preventing preferences generally, and distributing
to creditors the individual as well as partnership assets, and yet does not
carry them in for the two other main purposes of the bankruptcy tatute,
namely, protecting creditors against the preference of liens acquired within
four months of bankruptcy, and discharging the debtor from his debts." 285
Fed. 705.
"We cannot believe that Congress intended to limit and weaken the broad
provision of See. 5a permitting a partnership to be adjudged a bankrupt, by
making it essential to such an adjudication that the partners should also be
adjudged bankrupts individually. So to hold would make it impossible, in an
involuntary proceeding, to adjudge bankrupt a partnership as a separate
entity, although it was insolvent and had committed an act of bankruptcy, if
any of the partners could not be adjudged a bankrupt because he had not
committed an individual act of bankruptcy or was a person exempt from
such an adjudication, or for any other adequate reason" 48 Sup. Ct. Rep.
252.
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judication does not carry with it the adjudication of the partners
individually for the purpose of setting a zero hour in the process
of invalidating liens.
Thus it comes to pass that the United States Supreme Court
has recognized the entity theory of a partnership under the Bankruptcy Act. So much is expressly avowed by Mr. Justice Sanford
who wrote the opinion.
The law of partnership is made intricate because there is
no agreement as to the fundamental theory underlying this sort
of a business association. The conflict between the entity theory
and the aggregate theory seems to be as sharp as ever. There
seems to be a tendency to explain that this court or that court
adheres to one theory or the other. 3 The writer has thought it
more accurate to say that most, if not all, courts make use of both
theories when convenient as devices for rationalizing results which
they seek to reach. If the courts would only frankly avow what
seems to be the truth probably there would be less confusion than
there is today.
It has been frequently stated that section five of the Bankruptcy Act was written with a view of handling a partnership
as an entity. But time is a great leveller of hopes and the results
have not been what may have been expected.
It may be regarded as definitely settled that now a partnership may be adjudicated i bankrupt without regard to an adjudication of the partners individually.4 The reverse is also true.'
This partakes of the entity theory.
However if a partnership as an entity is made bankrupt
the trustee may draw unto himself the individual assets of partners. 6 The decision which announced this has been something
of a storm center. It is hardly consistent with an unadulterated
entity theory. 7
3. For example, see 41 Harv. Law Rev. 1044, 1046, reviewing the case
here noted.
4. See the long list of decisions cited for this in the opinion inder
review.
5. In re Mercur (1903) 122 Fed. 384.
6. Francis v. McNeal (1913) 228 U. S. 695, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 701, 57 L.
Ed. 1029, L. R. A. 1915-E, 706. In 41 Harv. Law Rev. 1045, it is stated: "It
is settled in the federal circuit courts that a partner may be required to file a
schedule of his individual assets and liabilities and that these assets may be
administered in the partnership bankruptcy even though the partner is not
bankrupt." This is followed by a note: "It is not clear whether the Supreme
Court has directly decided this question. See Fran.cis v. McNeal (1913) 228
U. S. 695. In this case the court assumed that the partner had consented to
filing a schedule and so could not complain. The reasoning of the case, however, would render consent immaterial, and the lower courts treat it as an
authority for their procedure."
The basis of this refinement seems to be a statement in the opinion that
"Francis has consented and agreed to hand over his property according to the
order of the'court." One may doubt whether such an agreement means anything in particular. Most of us have to obey the orders of court whether or
not we consent to them. Furthermore it would seem as if Francis resisted
the order and thus the matter was taken into the U. S. Supreme Court.
7. Notice this language of Mr. Justice Holmes: "Finally it would be a
third incongruity to grant a discharge in such a case from the debt consid-
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Other steps in the process of administration in bankruptcy
where a partnership is involved probe more deeply into partnership theory with resulting confusion and speculation. Some, of
the questions which have arisen are listed: (1) Does the adjudication of a partnership alone necessarily mean that the individual
assets of a partner or partners are to be administered by the trustee
for the creditors of the partnership? Or does he have choice?;
(2) If, upon the adjudication of a partnership alone, the individual assets of a partner or partners are taken by the trustee
for the creditors of the partnership, do creditors of partners individually have an opportunity to participate in the administration?
Or will the assets which should be appropriated to the creditors
of individual partners be turned back to the partners personally?;
(3) If a partnership alone is adjudicated, no individual assets
are handled, and then it is discharged, are the partners individually
discharged from (a) partnership debts; (b) individual debts?;
(4) Suppose in (3) that individual assets were handled, then
what?; (5) If a partnership alone is adjudicated are the partners
individually discharged from partnership or individual debts unless the order so states?; (6) If a partnership alone is adjudicated
do the partners have to file schedules of individual creditors under
sec. 17 (3)8 in order to obtain a discharge from individual debts?
Perhaps it is not too much to suggest that even though there have
been some decisions 9 and considerable debate, 10 final answers have
not been given to these questions excepting the answer given in
Myers v. International Trust Co."
KENNETH C. SEARS.
ered as joint but to leave the same persons liable for it considered as several.
We say the same persons, for however much the difference between firm and
members under the statute be dwelt upon, the firm remains at common law a
group of men, and will be dealt with as such in the ordinary courts for use
in which the discharge is granted."
8. Notice that by Sec. 17 of the Bankruptcy Act "a discharge
shall release a bankrupt. . . ." Such textual difficulties probably will be
ignored.
9. Nashville Saddlery Co. v. Green et al. (1921) 127 Miss. 98, 89 So.
816; Win. R. Moore Dry Goods Co. v. Ford (1920) 146 Ark. 227, 225 S. W.
320, 226 S. W. 139; Ellet-Kendall Shoe Co. v. Miller et al. (1923) 215 Pac.
417; Abbott v. Anderson (1914) 265 Ili. 285, 106 N. E. 782, L. R. A. 1915-F,
668; M-yers v. International Trust Co. (1927) 273 U. S. 380. Cf. the effect of
a discharge granted to a partner who alone has been adjudicated a bankrupt:
Jarecki Mfg. Co. v. McElwaine (1901) 107 Fed. 249; In re Kaufman (1905)
136 Fed. 262; Wagner Grocery Co. v. Dodd-Cooner Merc. Co. (1921) 206
Ala. 627, 91 So. 487; 20 Harv. Law Rev. 569; Lansing, etc., v. Heinze (1918)
184 App. Div. 129.
10. See note in L. IR A. 1915-F, 669, which argues that under Francis v.
McNeal, "a court cannot legally adjudicate in bankruptcy and discharge the
partnership as an entity apart from the members of the partnership"; 5
Minn. Law Rev. 309; 1 Collier "Bankruptcy" (13th ed.) p. 250; 5 Texas Law
Rev. 400; 37 Harv. Law Rev. 614, critical of Abbott v. Anderson (1914) 265
fI1. 285; 21 Col. Law Rev. 290; 20 Harv. Law Rev. 589; 22 Col. Law Rev.
348; 10 Mich. Law Rev. 215;'35 Yale Law Jour. 362.
11. (1927) 273 U. S. 380.

